"the 'ripple efffects' of the [9/11] attacks were so strong that they exposed the technical defĳiciencies of the existing security networks, as well as the fragility of the protective cocoon that was based upon the insurability of these risks at an international level." 3 Despite those ripple efffects, it took the international community a further seven years to develop its legal response to the issue of compensation to third party victims of aviation terrorism. This article will examine some of the key features of that Convention and attempt to address at least some of the reasons why entry into force has not happened and would appear unlikely in the near future.
5
At the same Diplomatic Conference, a separate Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties ("General Risks Convention") was also adopted. Notwithstanding its importance, the General Risks Convention remains outwith the scope of this article.
I believe that the academic in John Balfour will appreciate the intellectual challenge of evaluating some of the more unusual and innovative features of the Unlawful Interference Convention. I also expect that the practitioner in John, looking at the matter from the perspective of his airline and insurer clients, will take a fairly critical view of the overall scheme which the Convention seeks to implement.
1.
Introduction and background 
